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By Mark Aguiar, Manuel Amador, and Gita Gopinath
Many emerging market economies oscillate
between periods of high and low growth (see
Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007). These changes in
growth regimes generate business cycles that are
markedly dierent from the ones observed in de-
veloped countries: consumption and investment
are volatile relative to output, and net exports
are strongly counter-cyclical. This volatility is
often accompanied by sharp changes in the pol-
icy environment as well. For example, Figure
1 shows the relationship between two measures
of expropriation and political risk and real GDP
for Argentina between 1984 and 2007. For easy
comparison to the GDP series, the risk factors
are inverted so that an increase in the index cor-
responds to a decrease in risk, and all series are
normalized to 100 in 1984.
1 The risk factor se-
ries are highly correlated with output.
2 When
GDP is higher than average, the institutions and
government policies in Argentina foster growth,
as measured by increased political stability, en-
 Aguiar: University of Rochester,
P.O. Box 270156, Rochester, NY 14627
(mark@markaguiar.com); Amador: Stanford
University, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305
(amador.manuel@gmail.com); Gopinath: Harvard
University, 1805 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA
02138 (gopinath@fas.harvard.edu). Prepared for
the January 2009 AEA Annual Meeting. We thank
Andrew Atkeson, our discussant, for very helpful
comments. We also thank Thomas Sampson for
excellent research assistance.
1The measures of risk are taken from Political
Risk Services (PRS). The Expropriation Risk Index
is a scaled version of the PRS Investment Prole
series, which summarizes the government's attitude
toward inward investment based on four risk fac-
tors: expropriation, taxation, repatriation, and labor
costs. The Political Risk index assigns risk points to
a group of factors, of which, the Investment Prole
variable is one. Real GDP is from the World Devel-
opment Indicators.
2The correlation between the inverse measure of
expropriation risk and GDP is 0.68, and the political
risk and GDP is 0.71.
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Figure 1: Argentina: Time path of GDP and
Expropriation Risk
hanced respect for property rights, and stronger
contract enforcement.
In Aguiar et al. (forthcoming), we develop
a framework to understand these policy rever-
sals and the associated economic volatility.
3 In
particular, we explore the joint dynamics of
sovereign debt, investment, and expropriation
risk in a small open economy model. Our de-
parting point from previous work was the intro-
duction of two political economy frictions. The
rst friction is that the government cannot com-
mit to policies, either tax or debt policy. It al-
ways faces the temptation to expropriate capi-
tal and default on debt. The second friction is
that the risk of losing oce makes the govern-
ment impatient relative to the market. We show
theoretically that the combination of the gov-
ernment's impatience (however small) and in-
ability to commit generates perpetual cycles in
3In Aguiar et al. (forthcoming), we discuss how
our work relates to the existing literature and pro-
vide relevant references.
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both sovereign debt and investment in an envi-
ronment in which the rst best capital stock is
a constant. The small open economy dynamics
converge to a region where the expected tax on
capital varies with the state of the economy and
investment is distorted more in recessions than
in booms, generating persistent eects from iid
shocks.
In this note, we extend our previous work
along the following dimensions. First, we ex-
plore numerically the comparative statics of the
behavior of investment, consumption, output
and net exports to dierent rates of government
impatience. Second, we discuss the implications
of imposing a balanced budget rule on the gov-
ernment.
In our numerical exercise, we maintain a sim-
ple framework with iid shocks such that a gov-
ernment that discounts at the world interest rate
would generate zero volatility in investment and
consumption in the long run. The question we
address is how much volatility and persistence is
induced for reasonable reductions in the govern-
mental discount factor. We nd that the mag-
nitudes are substantial. If the government dis-
counts at 90 percent of the world interest rate,
investment volatility rises to approximately ve
times that of output. Similarly, consumption
volatility rises from zero to forty percent of out-
put volatility. Moreover, the cyclicality of net
exports switches signs { it is 1.0 at the world
discount factor but declines and turns negative
quickly as we increase the government impa-
tience parameter.
We then consider the impact of imposing a
balanced budget rule on the government. We
prove a version of the folk theorem that states
that the rst best allocation can be sustained
if the government is patient \enough." In our
numerical exercise, we show that the necessary
threshold for government patience is extremely
low. Specically, as long as the government's
discount factor is at least 20 percent of the world
interest rate, a balanced budget rule will deliver
the rst best allocation from the domestic agents
perspective (who are assumed to discount at the
world interest rate). Consequently, a balanced
budget rule, as is being followed in countries like
Chile and Brazil, can be welfare enhancing for
domestic agents.
I. Environment
We study a small open economy populated
by private agents and a government. There are
two technologies in the economy that produce
a single commodity. The traditional technol-
ogy is associated with an endowment stream
z.
4 The second technology has capitalists us-
ing domestic labor to produce output accord-
ing to y = A(z)f(k;l), where A is total factor
productivity indexed by z, k is capital, l is la-
bor, and f is a constant returns to scale pro-
duction function. Aggregate output is given by
F(z;k;l)  A(z)f(k;l) + z, and F is strictly in-
creasing in z. We model z 2 Z as a nite state
Markov process that is iid over time, and let
z
t = (z0;z1;:::;zt) denote the history of shocks
through time t. Let zmax be the highest possible
shock.
Risk neutral capitalists have an opportunity
cost r + , where r is the exogenous world risk
free rate and  is the depreciation rate.
5 Capital
is installed at the end of the previous period,
before the shock is realized. Let kt 1 = k(z
t 1)
denote capital installed at the end of period t  
1 after history z
t 1 and operated in period t.
Firms face a competitive spot labor market and
pay wages wt = w(z
t) in period t. Prots (gross
of rent and depreciation) are denoted (z
t) 
A(zt)f(kt 1;lt) wtlt. Prots are taxed at a rate
t = (z
t), which is set after capital is installed
and the shock is realized. We limit the tax rate
at 1, so that the government cannot take more
than 100 percent of the capital income. Taking
as given the equilibrium path of taxes, the rms'
optimality conditions for capital and labor are
therefore:
IEt 1(1   t)A(zt)fk(kt 1;lt) = r +  (1)
A(zt)fl(kt 1;lt) = wt: (2)
The notation IEt 1 refers to expectation condi-
tional on history through t   1. For future ref-
4The existence of the traditional technology is
needed to bound the autarky value from below (as
will be shown below). An alternative assumption
would be to impose a bound on the capital tax rate
that is less than unity.
5In particular, we can think of capitalists as for-
eign based who can completely diversify the shocks
hitting the small open economy.VOL. VOLUME NO. ISSUE EXPROPRIATION DYNAMICS 3
erence, let k
 denote the rst best capital. That
is, IEA(zt)fk(k
;1) = r + .
The primary actor in the model is a gov-
ernment, which taxes capital and labor income,
and borrows and lends a non-contingent bond
with the rest of the world. The absence of con-
tingent debt is without loss of generality, as
taxes are assumed to be state contingent and
can be used to trade resources across states of
nature. Let bt = b(z
t) denote the debt con-
tracted in period t and due in t + 1. The gov-
ernment's period budget constraint is given by
tt + bt = Tt + (1 + r)bt 1, where Tt denotes
lump sum transfers to the workers.
Workers do not have access to nancial mar-
kets directly (or, equivalently for our purposes,
the government has enough instruments to con-
trol their consumption/savings decisions). The
representative worker's budget constraint is ct =
wtl + Tt + zt.
As the government controls the worker's
consumption, we can combine and rear-
range their budget constraints into a single
aggregate resource constraint: F (zt;kt 1;l)
 (1   t)Fk (zt;kt 1;l)kt 1 +bt = ct + (1 +
r)bt 1. This equation states simply that con-
sumption and debt payments (the right hand
side) must equal total output minus equilibrium
payments to capital plus new debt.
The government's objective function is to
maximize the present discounted value of utility
of the workers: IE
P1
t=0 
tu(ct). The interpreta-
tion is as follows: u(ct) refers to the workers ow
utility. Workers and capitalists are assumed to
discount at the same rate,
1
1+r. However,  rep-
resents the government's discount factor, which
may be smaller than the agents'. This captures
a government that may lose oce and therefore
prefers consumption to occur sooner rather than
later.
6
The government chooses a sequence of taxes
to maximize this objective function subject to
the aggregate resource constraint and the rms'
rst order conditions. If the government could
commit to a tax plan, we show in Aguiar et al.
(forthcoming) that it would set taxes such that
k = k
 every period. That is, it would not dis-
6This is a special case of the more general po-
litical economy preferences studied in Aguiar and
Amador (2008).
tort capital. While this implies taxes are zero
\ex ante", they are not zero ex post, as taxes
and transfers with capitalists are useful to in-
sure the worker's consumption.
We are, however, interested in the case when
the government cannot commit to a tax plan.
We look for self-enforcing taxes such that the
government has no incentive to deviate along
the equilibrium path. These equilibria are sup-
ported by trigger strategies such that any de-
viation is punished by autarky, that is zero in-
vestment and no access to nancial markets.
7
If the government deviates, it transfers all the
output that period to the workers and then lives
o the endowment thereafter.
8 Therefore, the
value of deviation is: u(F(z;k;l))+Vaut, where
Vaut  IEu(z)=(1   ) is the government's value
function in autarky. A sequence of taxes and
debt positions must satisfy the following partic-
ipation constraints at every history:
(3)
IEt
1 X
s=0

su(ct+s)  u(F(zt;kt 1;lt)) + Vaut:
Faced with these constraints, we assume that the
government will pursue a sequence of taxes and
debt positions to maximize its objective func-
tion.
II. Equilibrium Allocations
The equilibrium allocation can be solved us-
ing standard recursive techniques. We consider
maximizing payments to debt holders condi-
tional on delivering a particular utility to the
government. This is the dual of the primal prob-
lem in which the government maximizes utility
given an outstanding stock of debt. The state
variable is the promised utility of the govern-
ment, v. Denote the net present value of pay-
ments to bond holders conditional on delivering
7In Aguiar and Amador (2008) we discuss condi-
tions under which autarky is the worst self-enforcing
equilibrium and so the particular equilibrium we
study is on the Pareto frontier.
8More generally, the country could also consume
the existing capital stock, or operate the capital for
a period of time. The important assumption is that
the utility from deviation is increasing in capital.
The current formulation is a useful technical simpli-
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v to the government as B(v).
Net payments to bond holders in a period is
F (zt;kt 1;l)   (1   t)Fk (zt;kt 1;l)kt 1   ct,
which is total output minus payments to capi-
tal and domestic consumption. As debt is non-
contingent, net payments are independent of the
particular realization of zt. We therefore can
average over the realizations zt, and as z is iid
over time the expectation will be independent
of the history through t   1. Taking expec-
tation over zt, the expected net payments are
IEfF (zt;kt 1;l)   (r + )kt 1   ctg, where we
use the fact that expected payments to capital
equal the opportunity cost in equilibrium.
The recursive problem can be expressed:
B(v) = (4)
max
(u(z);!(z);k)2

X
z2Z
(z)
"
F(z;k)   c(u(z))
  (r + )k +
1
1 + r
B(!(z))
#
subject to:
v 
X
z2Z
(z)[u(z) + !(z)] (5)
U(F(z;k)) + Vaut  (6)
u(z) + !(z); 8z 2 Z:
The choice variables are capital, state contin-
gent government utility u(z), and state contin-
gent continuation utility !(z), which will be the
next period's state variable. The function c(u) is
the inverse utility function, that is, the amount
of consumption need to deliver utility u. The
rst constraint is the promise keeping constraint
and the second constraint is the participation
constraint. The choice variables are taken from
a compact set 
, whose boundaries are chosen
so as not to constrain the equilibrium allocations
(See Aguiar et al., forthcoming, for details).
We studied the solution to this problem in
detail in Aguiar et al. (forthcoming). Here, we
summarize the key analytical results and refer
the reader to that paper for proofs. We start
with the optimal policy for capital. Capital
is strictly increasing in promised utility v un-
til k = k
. Specically, k = k
 for v  v
 
U(F(k;zmax)) + Vaut and k < k
 for v < v
.
Capital is never larger than the rst best. Con-
sidering the primal problem, a high v is equiv-
alent to a low stock of outstanding debt. The
results imply that debt crowds out capital. The
intuition for this result is that a large amount of
debt makes autarky relatively attractive. There-
fore, the government cannot credibly accommo-
date a large amount of investment in the pres-
ence of the strong incentive to deviate. This
translates into a high expected tax on capital.
Given the relationship of capital to the state
variable v, the next question is the evolution of
promised utilities. Risk aversion implies that the
full commitment solution equalizes consumption
(or utility) across states. However, states with
high z have a particularly attractive deviation
payo, so perfect insurance may not satisfy all
the participation constraints.
If v  v
, then participation constraints are
not binding and utility is equalized across states
in the following period. If v < v
, then con-
sumption is not equalized across states. In par-
ticular, high z states must have high consump-
tion to satisfy participation. The incentive to
smooth consumption over time implies that the
continuation values !(z) are also higher follow-
ing high shocks. Therefore, we have a spreading
out of continuation values, with high shocks gen-
erating high continuation values and low shocks
generating low continuation values. Given the
policy functions for capital, this generates a pos-
itive correlation between the shock and invest-
ment, despite the iid nature of the shock. That
is, the ability to smooth intertemporally, by us-
ing debt, induces persistence in the eect of z
on output.
If the government discounts at the risk free
rate, so that  = 1=(1 + r), then a stock of as-
sets is built over time until enough is accumu-
lated so that rst best capital and perfect insur-
ance is sustained in the long-run. However, if
 < 1=(1 + r), the government is too impatient
to sustain the rst best. In fact, the economy
converges to a unique, non-degenerate ergodic
distribution for k whose support lies strictly be-
low k
; that is, the economy will converge to
a region where some participation constraint is
always binding. The fact that this ergodic distri-
bution is unique implies that transfers, such as
a debt forgiveness policy, have only temporary
eects. The fact that the distribution is non-VOL. VOLUME NO. ISSUE EXPROPRIATION DYNAMICS 5
degenerate implies that volatility is a permanent
feature of the economy. An economy governed
by an impatient government is destined for lower
income and more volatility than one who dis-
counts at the market interest rate.
III. Numerical Analysis
While in Aguiar et al. (forthcoming) we show
that in theory even a small amount of govern-
ment impatience results in distortions in invest-
ment and consumption and volatile cycles in the
long-run, it does not shed light on the quantita-
tive magnitude of these distortions. We proceed
now to study the model numerically to shed light
on this question and to more generally evaluate
the comparative static eects of government im-
patience on economic variables.
Specically, we vary  and evaluate the
volatility, persistence and cross-correlation of
some key economic indicators. The goal of this
exercise is not a full calibration of a model econ-
omy. The purpose is to isolate the impact of
government impatience and obtain an estimate
of whether the eect is quantitatively signicant.
To that end, we maintain the simple framework
of iid shocks in which the economy produces zero
long run volatility in investment or consump-
tion when  = 1=(1 + r). The question at hand
is how much volatility is induced by alternative
discount factors.
For the exercise, we assume that the con-
sumption of the capitalists takes place abroad
(that is, they are foreign based). The parame-
ters of the model are set as follows.
9 A period
in the model is one year. Utility is represented
by the standard constant relative risk aversion
utility function with the coecient of relative
risk aversion set to 2. Total output is given
by F(z;k) = zk
 + z with  = 1=3. z take
two values, with the high shock set to 1.0 and
the low shock set to 0.9, and each state occurs
with probability 1=2 capturing the iid nature of
shocks. These values of z generate a variance
9The computer code used for the simulations is
available from the authors' website. The numerical
method used value function iteration on a 10;000
point grid (for each  in a range). With the optimal
policies computed, the articial economies were each
simulated for 106 periods to generate the moments
of the ergodic distribution.
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Figure 2: Mean Capital Relative to First Best
(k=k)
of 0:05, which is approximately the variance of
HP-ltered log output for Argentina.
10 We set
both the risk free rate and the depreciation rate
to 0:05.
We rst consider mean eects. Figure 2 plots
mean capital divided by k
 as a function of (1+
r). Recall that at (1 + r) = 1, capital is at the
rst best, so the ratio of mean capital to k
 is
one. As  decreases, we see that mean capital
is distorted down. Specically, at (1 + r) =
0:9, mean capital is distorted by 5 percent and
at (1 + r) = 0:8 the distortion approaches 10
percent.
Figure 3 plots the standard deviation of log in-
vestment normalized by the standard deviation
of log income, where standard deviations are
those of the ergodic distribution. At (1 + r) =
1, the ergodic distribution of investment is a
singleton at the rst best. As  declines, in-
vestment volatility increases markedly. For ex-
ample, at (1 + r) = 0:9, investment volatility
is ve times output volatility. This is a signi-
cant increase in volatility in that it is solely due
to contracting frictions given the iid nature of
the shocks. Note that the eect of  is non-
10Specically, using annual log output from 1960-
2007 we extract a trend using an HP lter with
smoothing parameter 100. The standard deviation
of detrended output is 5.9%. A smoothing parameter
of 6.25 yields a standard deviation of 3.6%.6 PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MONTH YEAR
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Figure 3: Relative Volatility of Investment:
StdDev(ln I)
StdDev(ln Y )
monotonic. As  approaches zero, no capital
can be supported in equilibrium and investment
is again constant.
Figure 4 plots the relative volatility of con-
sumption. Again, the benchmark is perfect in-
surance if  = 1=(1+r). However, a more impa-
tient government generates increased volatility
in consumption. The magnitudes are large: a
discount factor equal to 90 percent of the market
interest rate generates a consumption volatility
of 40 percent of output, compared to zero at
(1 + r) = 1.
Figure 5 indicates how the interaction of
sovereign debt and investment induces persis-
tence in output in an environment with iid
shocks. In particular, it depicts the autocorre-
lation of output in the ergodic distribution. In
the rst best, this autocorrelation is zero. How-
ever, as  falls, we see that output becomes au-
tocorrelated. While the magnitude of the auto-
correlation is not large in itself, recall that the
benchmark is zero. Relative to this benchmark,
governmental impatience adds 0:04 to the auto-
correlation when  is 90 percent of 1=(1 + r).
Finally, gure 6 plots the correlation of net
exports (F   C   I) with output. At the rst
best, capital is constant and consumption per-
fectly insured. This implies a positive correla-
tion between net exports and output, a standard
result of insurance in an open economy. How-
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Figure 4: Relative Volatility of Consumption:
StdDev(ln C)
StdDev(ln Y )
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Figure 6: Correlation of Net Exports/Income
with Log Income
ever, as we increase impatience, the correlation
of net exports with output turns negative. This
highlights how government impatience both lim-
its risk sharing and induces uctuations in in-
vestment.
IV. Balanced Budget Rules
The key source of volatility in the model is the
interaction of debt and investment. High levels
of debt displace capital due to the government's
inability to commit. This force, combined with
the cyclicality of debt, induces persistence and
investment volatility in an economy subject only
to iid shocks. A necessary condition for volatil-
ity in the ergodic distribution is that the govern-
ment is impatient relative to the market inter-
est rate; otherwise, the economy will build up
enough foreign assets to achieve the rst best.
If governmental impatience simply reects pri-
vate agents' preferences, the volatile allocation
is optimal and imposing an additional constraint
cannot improve welfare. On the other hand, if
governmental impatience reect political econ-
omy frictions rather than the true preferences
of private agents, access to debt induces excess
volatility, and might be welfare reducing.
Under the assumption that private agents dis-
count at the international risk free rate, the rst
best allocation features constant consumption
and constant investment. We ask whether a
balanced budget rule can deliver this rst best
allocation despite the presence of an impatient
government. To answer this question, we rst
prove a version of the folk theorem, which states
in this instance that if the government is \pa-
tient enough", the rst best can be sustained.
We then use our numerical model to quantita-
tively characterize the range of discount factors
for which the theorem is relevant. We leave aside
the question of why private agents can force a
government to follow a balanced budget, but not
force it to implement the full commitment allo-
cation directly. One can envision environments
in which the transparency of a balanced budget
rule make it feasible, while the complexities of
a full state-contingent rule may not be feasible.
However, fully modeling such an environment is
a more ambitious undertaking. In this note, we
restrict ourselves to the positive and normative
implications of a balanced budget rule and leave
aside the issue of implementation.
Under a balanced budget rule, the govern-
ment's external debt is constant, which we take
to be zero. There is therefore no state variable
that links periods given our iid shock process.
We can represent the government's welfare, V ,
in recursive form as
(7) V = max
k;c(z)
IE[u(c(z)) + V ];
subject to
(8) IE[F (k;z)]   IE[c(z)]   (r + )k = 0;
and
(9) u(c(z))+V  U(F(k;z))+Vaut;8z 2 Z:
The solution will feature a constant, maybe dis-
torted, investment. Therefore, under the bal-
anced budget assumption, either the rst best is
attainable immediately or it is never sustainable.
Whether the rst best is sustainable depends on
the government's discount factor. In this envi-
ronment, the folk theorem states that with a pa-
tient enough government, the full commitment
solution is sustainable:
PROPOSITION 1: There exists a 
 2 (0;1)
such that for all   
 the full commitment
solution is sustainable, and it is not sustainable
for  2 [0;
). In particular, if   
, then8 PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MONTH YEAR
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Figure 7: Difference Between First Best and
Deviation Under Balanced Budget
restricting the government to a balanced budget
achieves the rst best level of capital, k
?, and
constant consumption.
The proof of this proposition is in the ap-
pendix. While the proposition establishes the
existence of 
, it provides no guidance about
how patient the government must be. We shed
light on this question using the same numerical
model studied in the previous section. Speci-
cally, we vary  and solve for the dierence be-
tween the value function of the government at
the rst best allocation and the payo for de-
viation. We plot this dierence for the high z
shock in Figure 7, where the horizontal axis is
(1 + r) as before. For high 's, this dierence
is positive, implying that the rst best is sus-
tainable.
11 The value of 
 relative to 1 + r
can be found at the point where the dierence
crosses the horizontal axis. For this particu-
lar parametrization, 
 is roughly 0:18=(1 + r).
That is, the government needs a discount factor
more than 80 percent smaller than the market
rate before a balanced budget rule fails to de-
liver the full commitment allocation. While ad-
mittedly stylized, these numbers indicate that
balanced budget rules can realistically help sta-
bilize investment without signicantly distorting
investment.
11Note that if the incentive constraint is slack for
the high shock, it must be slack also for the low shock
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Note that the full commitment and the de-
viation allocations are independent of the value
of . Let c
 denote consumption under com-
mitment: c
 = IE[F(z;k
)   (r + )k
]. Dene
the dierence in the present discounted value of
utility under the commitment allocation and au-
tarky as ():
()  IE
1 X
s=0

s+1[u(c
)   u(F(z;0))] = (10)

 
u(c
)   IEu(F(z;0))

1   
:
Note that u(c
) > IEu(F(z;0)), as k
 > 0 and
c
 is the optimal plan. Therefore, the value in
the numerator is strictly positive. This implies
that () is strictly increasing in , is equal to
zero when  = 0, and approaches innity as 
approaches one. We can write the participation
constraints at the commitment allocation as
(11) u(c
)   u(F(z;k
))   ():
As the right-hand side of (11) is strictly decreas-
ing in , and the left-hand side does not vary
with , if this constraint is satised at , then
it is satised at any 
0 > . When  = 0, the
right-hand side of (11) is zero and the constraint
will not hold for some z. When  ! 1, the
right-hand side of (11) approaches minus inn-
ity, implying there is a 
 < 1 for which all the
participation constraints are satised at the full
commitment allocation for   
, and at least
one constraint is violated at the full commitment
allocation for  < 
.
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